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Abstract This article examines the rationales of Dutch politicians for tackling the
perceived pressing problem of ‘anti-social behaviour’ (ASB) and the question did they
copy the British approach? The first part will describe in short the concept of policy
transfer and the recent British fight against ASB. The focus will be on the introduction
of the Anti-social Behaviour Order. The second part is an empirical study into the Dutch
retreat from ‘condoning’ ASB, consisting of interviews with Dutch politicians focusing
on their ideas for tackling ASB. Those are compared with the British’s rationales. This
kind of comparative elite ethnography is not common in criminology, but this article
aims at providing evidence of its benefits. By answering the research question an insight
into the origins of policy in the sphere of criminal justice can be obtained.
Introduction
On September 14, 2008 the problem of anti-social behaviour (henceforth ASB)
became front-page news in the Netherlands. In Gouda1 several bus drivers refused to
drive through a certain neighbourhood any longer, because of the ASB they
encountered on their daily rounds. Especially young Moroccans were accused of
terrorising the public transport routes. Their ASB in the form of yelling, spitting at
other passengers and intimidating the bus drivers was no longer tolerated. The
situation escalated when television journalists were threatened by the youngsters. A
Dutch politician claimed the neighbourhood had turned into a ‘no-go area’.2
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1A small city of 70.845 inhabitants (www.gouda.nl)
2MP Mark Rutte in the Telegraaf (October 3, 2008).
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As a result an emergency debate in Dutch parliament on the problem of ASB was
called. During the heated political discussion, nuisance in the public domain3 was
labelled an ‘acute problem’ that pressed for ‘a quick and harsh response’. This
Gouda-debate generated some remarkable media quotes; ‘ASO-terror damages
public transport’, ‘Send the army’, ‘tough actions needed against street terror’,
‘tackle street terror today, not tomorrow’, and ‘anti-social behaviour wreaks serious
havoc in many Dutch cities’.4 Although the perceived problem of ASB by Moroccan
youth has been on the Dutch societal agenda for the last six to eight years, now (after
recent incidents like Gouda) it appears more acute.
Of course ASB is hardly a new phenomenon [44, 50]. Twenty years ago nuisance
in the public domain was a reality as well. But in those days, the byword was to
condone (turning a blind eye) [11]. But nowadays ASB has become a major policy
preoccupation and it is directly connected to the problems of young immigrants from
Morocco [42]. For many Dutch politicians it is now self-evident that the government
should act firm against ASB [29, 37, 45, 49].
In this article the Dutch retreat from ‘condoning’ ASB is examined by identifying
the underlying principles offered by politicians for tackling this kind of behaviour.
These Dutch rationales are compared to the British ones.
First stage of the empirical study consists of a content analysis of British and
Dutch key government and parliamentary documents (debates, votes, reports).5 In
order to produce a brief narrative of the process of policymaking, the focus will be
on the development of the Anti-social Behaviour Order (henceforth ASBO). The
ASBO as a case study is an easy choice because of its political attraction. Dutch
politicians often cite this English measure and refer to the ASBO as a recipe for
success [25]. It will be interesting to find out why the ASBO is so appealing for
Dutch politicians.
The second stage consists of a series of interviews with key participants in the
policy process.6 The actors involved are Dutch elected officials, Dutch spokesman of
political parties and British and Dutch civil servants. The Dutch political landscape
is quite diverse. In total eleven different political parties are represented in
parliament. Interviews were conducted with the nine biggest. Furthermore four
members of city councils of Amsterdam and Rotterdam and five high ranking
policymakers were interviewed.7 The interviews resulted in rich first hand-accounts
of the Dutch policy process and of the perceptions of key actors.8 Why is this kind of
elite comparative ethnography useful for the study of policymaking in the sphere of
criminal justice?
3 Both ‘anti-social behaviour’ and ‘nuisance in the public domain’ are contested concepts. Defining what
is currently meant by them is not straightforward and is context-specific. In this article the concepts refer
to persistent, un-acceptable non-criminal or minor criminal behaviour of young people in a public order
context.
4 Debate on the 25th of September 2008, after incidents of anti-social behaviour in the city of Gouda lead
to widespread public outcry (AD, Telegraaf, NRC).
5 Key documents are those papers that concern the tackling of ASB after the publication of the Dutch
government paper To a safer society [35]. This document has been chosen as a point of departure because
as also Pakes [37] argues, this appears the formal beginning of the tougher approach on ASB.
6 The research has been conducted from July till November 2008.
7 In general I was successful in gaining access to senior politicians and policy-makers. Nonetheless at their
request, their quotes have been impersonalized.
8 In total N=18.
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Policy in the making
There are different macro views on the international component of the origins of
crime policies. Some scholars stress the differences in policy interventions between
countries [33, 47]. A strong theme within this body of work is the focus upon the so-
called American distinctiveness in the area of crime control [27]. One of the
limitations of this approach is that some highly important globalising effects in
policy making are overlooked.
On the other hand, there is a substantial body of academic work that stresses the
similarities of criminal justice policies [14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 39]. These academic
works argue that the spread of democratic institutions and parallel social and
economic forces have shaped related public policies. They highlight the emergence
of a common risk society or a culture of control. To illustrate, Garland [18] argues
that crime policies in the UK and USA have become increasingly similar.
Indeed there is much in the Western cultures of control that appears to be in
common. But again there are limitations to these studies.9 In general there is a
tendency to overemphasize the trends that confirm this thesis and to downplay
divergent developments.
The point of this article is not to deny a general trend of a culture of control or to
suggest that differences between countries do not exist. This study does not focus on
identifying macro developments. It aims at providing an additional perspective by
means of exploring the process of policymaking on a meso-level.10
Policy represents the outcome of a complex set of processes. It is acknowledged
that copying or (consciously) overlooking polices from abroad is part of this. But the
significance of individual decisions and actions of political actors in this process is
often underrated. That is why in this article their views will be studied.
The concept of policy transfer can be useful in this study because it concerns
individual political decisions. Policy transfer is defined as a process by which
knowledge of policies, administrative measures, institutions and ideas in one
political system, are consciously used in the development of policies, administrative
measures, institutions and ideas in another political system [12].
It is interesting to see whether policy transfer between the UK and the
Netherlands has taken place or not. Thereby establishing a difference between soft
transfer (including ideas, concepts, lessons and attitudes) and hard transfer
(including actual policy instruments and legislation) [16].
Of course with this approach there are limitations as well. For example over
emphasizing the degree of individual rationality in policymaking process. The
respondents can be rationalising their choices after they were made, but during the
process of policymaking they perhaps were less conscious of them.
Furthermore it is difficult to separate external influences from domestic policy
developments and external examples can simply serve to confirm an already decided
approach. Pollit [40] points out that labels are frequently borrowed (because of their
legitimating power) but in actual action, policy can differ. And there is a tendency of
9 Most writers are aware of the problems of a broad perspective but aimed at understanding macro trends
in penal policy [27].
10 In this article the meso-level concerns the role of political actors in the policy make-up of their countries
crime policies.
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exaggerated claims, assumed from similarities in policy rhetoric. Therefore it is
important to look for evidence of non-transfer as well.
English measures and rationales in short
In 1998 the ASBO was introduced in England and Wales.11 The then Prime minister,
Tony Blair, stated that if traditional criminal law processes in cases of antisocial
behaviour continued to abide, the rights of victims would be allowed to be routinely
trampled upon and would leave courts fighting 21st century crime with 20th century
methods. He claimed that the use of control orders was the best available means for
protecting the public from ASB.12
ASBOs have a minimum duration of two years, can last indefinitely, and contain
prohibitions considered necessary to prevent the repetition of a person’s anti-social
behaviour [4]. In the law, the conduct is defined as ‘behaviour which caused or was
likely to cause alarm, harassment, or distress to one or more persons not of the same
household as him or herself’ [23].
In most cases an acceptable behaviour contract (ABC) is issued first. It’s a written
agreement made between a person who has been involved in ASB and their local
authority/landlord or police. ABCs are not legally binding and there does not have to
be an ABC in place before an ASBO application is made [23]. Then when the
agreement is breached in most cases it can be followed up with an ASBO [5].
The ASBO is a civil order. Restraints of certain behaviour are imposed by a civil
court and breaching is a criminal offence [1]. It is a multi step prohibition, a civil
order backed up by a criminal penalty [10].13 As Millie [34] pointed out, within a
relatively short period of time, the ASBO became in regular usage and is now part of
the common lexicon.
In the UK, the government is clear on the question why ASB should be tackled;
“Anti-social behaviour ruins lives: It does not just make life unpleasant; it prevents
the renewal of disadvantaged areas and creates an environment where more serious
crime can take hold,” as can be read in several governmental documents [22].
So much is said in one sentence. Jacobson [26] spotted three answers in this
single sentence. They argued that this alone may suggest that there is ‘room to take a
critical view of the different rationales for tackling ASB’.14 Their study combined
empirical research with a review of policy and research literature. They identified
among others, the following rationales;
– Quality of life; ASB should be tackled because it is a serious problem that makes
people miserable and fearful.
– Broken windows rationale; ASB should be tackled because if left unattended, it
leads to serious crime.
11 The crime and disorder act (1998) introduced ASBOs.
12 <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11769.asp>.
13 The two-step prohibition structure can be placed in the tradition of the Statutory Nuisance Abatement
Notice. It dates back into the 19th Century and would have been a familiar power to the local housing
managers who invented the original proposal for the Community Safety Order [44].
14 Page 37
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– Regeneration rationale; action on ASB should contribute to the social and
economic regeneration of local areas.
These British findings formed the starting point of this study. By comparing the
English rationales with the underlying reasons of Dutch politicians it will become
clear whether policy transfer has taken place or not.
Dutch measures
Recently, as was described in the introduction, Dutch authorities have stepped up
their focus of attention for the problem of ASB. Nuisance in the public domain is
coupled with war rhetoric and addressed with strong measures. But not so long ago
the Dutch were famous for crime policies with a strong ‘social’-character [42]. This
was combined with the earlier mentioned Dutch practice of condoning (gedogen)
also defined as regulated tolerance [3, 7].
But this history of tolerance was one of the first in 21st century Europe to collide
with the on-street realities of young Muslim immigrants [51]. In particular around
the rise of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn in 2001 there was an increasingly
critical public reaction towards this idea of regulated tolerance especially towards
young Muslims [37]. The general view was that gedogen had gone too far and that
authority has lost authority [41].
The Dutch government reacted with the publication of the paper To a safer society
[35]. This document appears as also Pakes [37] argues, to be the formal beginning of
the tougher approach on ASB. It was for the first time that ASB was directly linked
to crime and feelings of unsafety. In brief, the government aimed at more police on
the street, tougher enforcement of existing rules and where necessary introducing
new measures [35].
Later on in October 2004, the Dutch Government was further pressurized to
address the problems in the public domain. This heat developed due to a widely
publicised case in which a couple had been ‘forced out’ of their house by harassment
from a group of Moroccan youths [29]. In short, the couple no longer felt safe in the
Diamantbuurt in Amsterdam because they were tormented and called all sorts of
names by these youngsters [45, 49]. The group had ended up throwing stones
through the couple’s window, and the two moved out of the area. In a reaction
several politicians called for tougher measures to tackle ‘street terror’.15 The
Minister for Justice considered adopting the ASBO, but after counter-advise from
the chief prosecutor the Minister decided against it [5]. In stead the later discussed
ABC-pilot in Rotterdam was introduced.
In 2007 after more incidents of ASB by young Moroccans,16 discussions in the
Dutch parliament of addressing ASB were rekindled. In June of that year, two
chairpersons representing local boroughs in Amsterdam17 suggested introducing the
ASBO in the Netherlands. They stated that in the UK it was successful in reducing
ASB in inner-city areas. “The ASBO helps in the fight against young people
15 0405tkkvr381. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004–2005 (vraag 381).
16 In Amsterdam neighbourhoods (Slovervaart) in Utrecht (Kanaleneiland) and the Hague (Transvaal).
17 Resp. Slovervaart and de Baarsjes.
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terrorising the streets, before criminal law comes into the picture,” said local council
chairman Arco Verburg.18 He referred to the new British laws ‘as the best way to
respond to problems in the public domain’.19
In the last three years, there have been several pilots in Rotterdam, Utrecht and
Amsterdam copying the ideas of the ASBO. For example the ABC-project in
Rotterdam called, ‘knock off20’. This pilot was based, just like the ASBO, on a multi
step approach. The first is an intervention in the form of a contract, issued by a
welfare officer or street warden (stadsmarinier) and signed on a voluntary basis by
the problem maker. When the contract is breached, an order is issued by the mayor.
As soon as this order is violated the culprit will be brought before a criminal court.
This is in line with the already existing article 184 Sr (penal code) that prescribes
ignoring an official order constitutes a criminal offence and may lead to a penal
sanction. During one case in the pilot, a police court judge issued a fine, because a
youngster breached a restraining order.21 The ASBO was a direct inspiration for this
pilot, as can be read in the evaluation report.22 Some high ranking policymakers
traveled to the UK and visited the Home Office to get information on the ASBO.
In addition to this pilot, the Dutch government is preparing to enact new
administrative legislation that provides local authorities with more legal instruments
(often called administrative sanctions) to react to and prevent ASB [30]. For instance
there is a new law in the making; titled severe anti-social behaviour that in many
ways is similar to the ASBO.23 The proposed law24 gives more power to local
authorities. Mayors can issue restraining orders to people who have displayed anti-
social behaviour without the interference of a judge and for a longer period of time
than the current law allows.
This new law is designed so that the mayor can act quickly when he considers the
ASB to be a serious problem. A precise definition of ASB is not given in the proposal,
but it declares that the behaviour should be ‘persistent and grave’. Information on the
case can come from partners in the judicial system, like the police, but also from
administrative authorities, like social services and the local Department of Education.
The restraining order can be issued for a year and must be revised every 3 months.25 If
the order is breached, it becomes a criminal act (on the basis of the already existing
article 184 Sr) and the case can be brought before a criminal court.26
Although the ASBOs are measures under civil law (with a local judge issuing the
order) and the Dutch proposal is based within administrative law (mayor can issue
order), the ideas behind it are very similar. Like the English counterpart this
18 <http://www.nicis.nl/nicis/dossiers/Zorgenwelzijn/Jeugdzorg/verrijktdossier/Jongerenoverlast_1132.
html> (accessed May 30, 2008).
19 As stated in the Volkskrant (June 13, 2007).
20 Translated as “ff kappe”.
21 The evaluation rapport concluded that the effects of the Pilot could not be measured (Letter to
parliament Evaluatie Doe-Normaal pilot, Ministerie van Justitie and Minister van BZK, (5554663/08)).
22 See notes in the Letter to parliament Evaluatie Doe-Normaal pilot, Ministry of Justice and the Home
Office (5554663/08).
23 Others are, the ‘minor nuisance at municipal level act’ (still in draft), and ‘the public prosecution service
settlement act’ [11].
24 Official title in Dutch; ‘Maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast (31 467).’
25 Or one can be ordered to report at certain times.
26 A prison sentence up to three months or a fine can be the end result.
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proposed Dutch law is a multi-stage approach, containing of two different elements
(contract and order). Furthermore, breaches of the orders constitute a criminal
offence and may lead to penal sanctions (including prison sentences).
In the Netherlands, mayors have more power in this respect than their British
counterparts. According to current law, they can also issue restraining orders, but
with the new law they can prolong this period and couple it to ‘a duty to report’. In
addition, the public prosecutor has more authority as well.27
So one can conclude by the measures taken that the English approach appears
enormously attractive for Dutch politicians. Although this is not entirely a one-way
traffic. In Britain the earlier discussed Dutch-style street wardens were copied [5].
But still the attraction is for the most part one-sided. Especially the ASBO is
seductive. This is remarkable because British scholars regularly criticise the ASBO
[19, 20]. For instance, it has been condemned for potentially criminalising more day-
to-day behaviour (the so called net-widening effect) [1, 4, 8, 13, 24]. Furthermore
because it has become a so-called badge of honour. Some teenagers are proud of
their cool ASBOs [32].
Tonry [48] also criticised the ASBO sharply; ‘by making ASB into a major social
policy problem, and giving it sustained high visibility attention, Labour has made a
small problem larger’ ([48]:57).
Also outside the academic world, there is criticism [31]. For instance the
European commissioner for Human rights expressed his great concern.28 In Great
Brittan ASBOs can be imposed on children as young as ten. The European
commissioner feared young children can be detained for breaching ASBOs and can
incur a criminal record without actually having committed any recognisable offence
[2, 10].
Another point of interest is the sharp decline in the use of ASBOs in England and
Wales in 2006 [6]. There appears to be a growing disillusion, on a political and
practitioners level, with the measure.
It will be interesting to figure out why these negative effects of the ASBO,
academic criticism and recent developments appear not to be relevant for Dutch
politicians and what the rationales are for the retreat from regulated tolerance.
Dutch political rationales
To get a picture of the underlying reasons for tackling ASB, members of parliament
(MPs) and members of the city councils of Amsterdam and Rotterdam29 were
interviewed. They were questioned on the basis of a topic list.30 Addressing issues
like the definition of ASB, the enforcement of current and new measures and reasons
27 For example; Restraining order, duty to report, contact injunction.
28 Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the United Kingdom,
4th–12th November 2004, The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, 8 June
2005, pp. 34–37.
29 The respondents represent various political parties, only when there are notable political differences
between the statements is this mentioned.
30 Topics on the list were; ASB definition, current measures, causes of ASB, reasons for tackling ASB,
future, extent of ASB etc.
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for tackling ASB. Subsequent to analysing the results, five rationalities for
addressing the problem of ASB have been identified.
1. the assumed link between disorder and crime
The often cited idea by the respondents is that ASB should be tackled because left
unattended it leads to crime. Many respondents state that if minor incidents of ASB
are left untouched, disorder can provoke fear, and fear in itself helps to create the
physical and social environment in which real crime can develop. ‘When people
observe that ASB is not addressed, people will feel afraid and withdraw from public
spaces; “they will not intervene when they observe crime”, as one MP stated.’
The idea of a cycle of ASB, fear and crime is often mentioned. The Broken
Window Theory is mentioned as the theoretical idea behind this. One of the MPs
directly referred to this theory; “The Broken Window Theory has proven that minor
nuisances in the public domain should be addressed by the government to prevent
things from getting worse”.
Other respondents, upon being asked, say they are familiar with this theory but appear
unaware that there is only a weak amount of evidence for this effect. They often state
‘this idea is very logical’. So the Broken Window Theory has a very intuitive appeal. In
general ASB is perceived as a seedbed of a persistent criminal career; “If politicians do
not treat ASB seriously this will definitely lead to problems in the future”.
Although some MPs state that the current arsenal of measures is enough to address
the problems, the ASBO-approach of New Labour is often (85%) mentioned as the best
way forward. One MP directly cited Labour’s vision; ‘tough on crime, tough on the
causes of crime’. He claimed that; ‘We can learn from Labour’s ideas, because they have
the same problems but on a larger scale. So if the ASBO works there it will definitely
work here.’ Four politicians underlined the idea of the ASBO but argued that it should
be coupled with existing social policies addressing the roots of the problems.
2. economic reasons
The general idea among the respondents is that by tackling ASB, the cycles of
economic and social decline in a neighbourhood can be reversed. Some MPs suggest
that ASB threatens house prices and discourages investment. They argue that social
disorganization and the associated lack of informal social control can lead to a spiral
of neighbourhood decline. “Social cohesion is declining, that is a cause of the
increasing problem of ASB.”
It is not surprising that politicians mention this reason for tackling ASB. The
economic theme is an important political issue for the current Dutch administration;
they want to turn around the so called ‘deprived Neighbourhoods’ into ‘better-to-do’
areas.31 This urban renewal project is known as the 40 districts approach.32 Over a
thousand million Euro is invested to establish this turnaround.33
31 Translated in Dutch as ‘prachtwijken’or ‘Vogelaar-wijken’.
32 Objectives of GSB Urban Policy Programs are • To improve objective and perceived security • To improve the
quality of the built environment • To improve social cohesion within society as a whole • Bind middle and higher
income groups to the cities • Enhance the economic performance of Dutch cities see http://www.nicis.nl/
kenniscentrum/binaries/nicis/bulk/publicaties/2008/10/engelstalige-factsheet-gsb3-en-krachtwijken.pdf.
33 Kamerstukken II 2007–2008, 28 684, nr. 130, te vinden op <www.minbzk.nl//onderwerpen/veiligheid/
veilige-samenleving/nieuws-en/110943/kabinet-en-gemeenten>.
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The ideas of collective efficacy and its close relative the concept of social capital are
of importance here. “People must feel connected to their neighbourhood. Tackling ASB
will help in restoring community feelings,” as a respondent explained. The ASBO is
mentioned in this context although several respondents explicitly state that new
measures for addressing ASB should be coupled with a social approach as well.
The ideas of Robert Putman appear especially alluring for the Christen
Democrats; they often emphasize the importance of social cohesion in relation to
ASB. One MP cited from Putmans book Bowling alone [43]; “Social capital can
help to mitigate the dangerous effects of socioeconomic disadvantage”.
3. the idea of the quality of life
All respondents state that ASB is a serious problem that makes people miserable
and fearful. Regardless of their political background the politicians say that ASB
makes people feel unhappy and unsafe. Quotes like ‘security is a necessity of life’
and ‘ASB can make people feel threatened’ are mentioned more than once. So ASB
has to be addressed because of the unhappiness it causes. “Even small incidents of
ASB can spark a general feeling of insecurity. These incidents have signal value,” as
one respondent reacted.
Although this is generally a popular theme, some MPs question the feelings of
unsafety, suggesting that maybe the attention for ASB is increasing and not so much
the actual problem itself. And that the complaints of people are only evidence of an
increasing intolerance of young people and minorities. This more sceptical idea is
not restricted to one political party, but is mentioned by left wing as well as right
wing MPs.
4. ASB is closely linked to the problem of minorities
The politicians generally emphasize that in inner city areas mostly young
immigrants from Morocco are responsible for the nuisance in the public domain. It
cannot be a big surprise that especially far right wing parties mentioned this
problem, claiming that ‘young Moroccans make the streets of big cities unliveable’.
And that harsh measures like ‘sending them back to Morocco’ are the best solution.
However these ideas are not restricted to conservative politicians. All political
parties link ASB in some way to the problem of minorities. A number of the MPs
argue that because of low levels of social integration young Moroccans terrorise the
streets. “Addressing their behaviour with strong measures like restraining orders, a
curfew, or behavioural contracts could break the cycle of isolation and alienation of
young immigrants,” as one respondent suggested.
Also the respondent of one of the country’s biggest left-wing party stated that
politicians had for too long failed to acknowledge the problems of the integration
process. “We focused too long only on welfare. Now is the time to introduce
effective punishment for trouble-making young people.”
Other politicians approached this subject in a more subtle way and raised the issue
of enforcing morals. They state that concepts like responsibility, respect and
tolerance and shared understanding of what kind of behaviour is and is not
acceptable in Dutch society, should be promoted in general.
Among the different parties there is a universal belief that ASB is getting worse
by the day. And that this kind of behaviour is starting at a younger age now, even 12-
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miners. “Above all, young Moroccans are a large part of this younger group. We
have to tackle their ASB with for example contracts coupled with orders, at an early
age to prevent things from getting worse. They have to be told that this kind of
behaviour is not accepted in the Netherlands,” as a member of the government party
reasoned.
Legitimacy of the government
Broadly cited by politicians is the idea that ignoring the rising problem of ASB
would undermine the credibility of the government. One MP described this idea as
follows; “ASB must be addressed, otherwise people will ask; ‘Why is this kind of
behaviour accepted? And if the police do not act, people will’”.
Different respondents refer to the ideas of Pim Fortuyn and claim that after his murder
people lost their faith in the government.34 That is why it is believed the government has
to act firmly when confronted with problems in society. It is generally accepted among
the respondents that ignoring the problem of ASB can eventually lead to vigilantism.
So tackling ASB is deemed necessary in order to keep the confidence of the people.
Some MPs question the reasoning that Dutch citizens only want hasher measures
to address ASB. They are familiar with the results from recent research that once
people were asked what there biggest ASB concern was, 35% stated dog dirt.35 But
the MPs still thought that addressing ASB more firmly was a right route to follow.
“No harm done when making the streets safer,” as one respondent reasoned. “From
my own experience I know that stronger measures help,” reacted another.
Three politicians were familiar with a recent report on the effects of punishment.
It concluded that there was no proof for the assumption that harsher measures will
reduce levels of ASB [52]. These MPs stressed the importance of social policy. “The
government cannot act on every form of nuisance in the public domain. We must not
create the expectations that we will. It is more important that the root problems of the
troublemakers, like truancy are addressed.”
However in the end almost all respondents said that they still believed it to be true
that harsher measures will tackle ABS. “I just know that addressing ASB is
necessary and that the government should act firmly. I do not need scientific
arguments to back up these facts,” as a respondent ended his interview.
Discussing results
To sum up, the interviews confirm the earlier observation that the ASBO is
extremely attractive for Dutch politicians. The same reasoning (measures are needed,
ASB is increasing), the same ideas (quality of life, broken window, economic
reasons) and the same solutions (behavioural contracts) are used in political
arguments. In combination with the earlier described exchange of ideas (Dutch
policymakers traveled to the UK to get information on the ASBO) and references to
34 Thereafter a so-called revolt of the voters.
35 Veiligheidsmonitor Rijk 2007.
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the ASBO in policy documents, it can be concluded that undeniably a soft transfer of
policy took place.
Also the intention for hard transfer appears apparent. Both the pilot in Rotterdam
as well as the new law in the making (severe anti-social behaviour), refer to the
example of the ASBO and the supposed success of the English approach. Although a
milder version of the ASBO has been adopted (the ABC in the pilot), at least a form
of hard policy transfer indeed did take place [5].
These results appear to confirm the idea of a common culture of control or risk
society [14, 17, 18, 24, 39]. In short, indeed the two countries faced comparable
problems that gave rise to similar (partly copied) solutions and politicians argued
along the same lines (see rationales 1, 2, 3).
However these analyses can be misleading. As I stated earlier, in comparative
research there is tendency of exaggerated claims, assumed from similarities in policy
rhetoric. Therefore in order to get a complete picture, it is important to look for
evidence of non-transfer as well. In the sense that dissimilarities in the policy
rationales can be identified.36
In contrast with the parallels, the empirical data also illustrate that Dutch society
faces its own particular problems (see rationales 4 and 5). These own rationales can
elucidate the Dutch retreat from the policy of turning a blind eye. All respondents
coupled young Moroccans with the problems of ASB in inner city areas.
In Dutch inner cities there are troubled community relations with youngsters from
minority groups. Especially the Moroccan youth groups are believed to behave in an
anti-social manner. Ethnographic fieldwork in Amsterdam showed that this often
concerns intimidating group behaviour. De Jong 2007 [28] who followed a group of
Moroccan youngsters over several years stresses their harsh street culture. Being part
of a so-called ‘Moroccan’ street culture stresses their identity and their position in
society, which is in turn reinforced by media attention and political worries. In the
UK ASB is less coupled with the immigration issue. Perhaps this is not so surprising
considering the English class society. The social problems in British inner cities are
of a different order. On the notorious housing estates unemployment, crime and ASB
trouble all sections of the population; British and immigrants alike. As also Lippens
[30] points out, the Dutch problems are not that severe as in the UK. Most Dutch
politicians agreed that the British situation in British cities is worse. “But if the
ASBO works even there, it certainly will here,” as a city councilor argued.
Furthermore this comparative research shows that Dutch politicians stress
‘legitimacy of the government’ as a reason for tackling ASB. For the UK this
appears a less acute problem. This difference is interesting because in their
statements the respondents often use the ASBO as a legitimating power. The
supposed success37 of the ASBO operates as a useful myth that can work in the
advantage of the politicians [37]. The fact that up until now there has been no
objective evaluation report on the introduction of the ASBO available does not seem
to influence the ideas of the Dutch policymakers. Parliament recently agreed to
prolong the pilot in Rotterdam.38
36 Besides the most apparent that there are two different judicial systems.
37 There is not yet prove of positive effects of the ASBO. Ipsos MORI a research company will publish an
evaluation at the beginning of 2009.
38 Vote on motie Anker, 11-11-2008 (Tcm118-175522).
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It is often debated that after the ‘Pim-Fortuyn’ revolt there is tendency among
Dutch politicians to swiftly pick up new trends and catchphrases from abroad [37,
42, 49]. Almost all the interviewees confirmed this idea of following trends in crime
control. They feel that in order to keep (or restore) the faith of the people, new
actions against crime and ASB are vital. This could be an explanation for the
popularity of the ASBO as well. The British measure functions like a sort of policy
umbrella that promises something new and effective. It furthermore legitimises the
shift in Dutch policies from social to more repressive measures.
The ASBO is interpreted by the respondents the way they see fit. For instance
some describe the ASBO as a preventive measure for ‘avoiding things getting worse’
or for ‘the problems of immigration’, others see it as a repressive measure for
‘teaching them a lesson’. It is remarkable to see that the ‘soft’ practices of a strong
social policy in neighbourhoods is not completely abandoned. The more left-wing
politicians attempt to combine the ASBO with more ‘social community work’,
stressing that the ASBO can only work when social agencies work together to
address the root problems as well.
Equally striking is that most politicians do not need real evidence for the
effectiveness of the ASBO. The myth of its success is enough. An explanation for
this line of reasoning can be the idea of precautionary logic. As also [46] points out,
the zero tolerance approach of ASB appears to be inspired by a precautionary
principle,39 where the lack of scientific evidence is not an excuse of inaction. Also
[39] advocates such a view, arguing that the precautionary principle has become a
governmental rationality in many Dutch policy processes. It is a perfect way of
doing politics because you do not have to prove anything. Just as [46] argues, the
success of the ASBO is not influenced by scientific research but is more an
instinctive response.40
The data presented in this article indeed suggest that the ASBO has in essence an
emotive appeal for Dutch politicians as well. But does this confirm the idea of the
precautionary principle as a dominant governmental rationality? It could be, but is it
not equally true that the policy processes were never really backed up by scientific
evidence? Tony Blair himself reflected upon the use of scientific research. “You can
argue about statistics until the cows come home and there is usually a very great
credibility gap between whatever the statistics put out and whatever people actually
think is happening, but the real point is not about statistics, it is about what people
feel.”41
Also the interviewees confirmed the preference for action above thorough
scientific research. In general they argued that tackling ASB both embodies a
common-sense understanding and an appeal to popular sentiments. And that there
was no time left for inaction. “Something has to be done to tackle street-terror,” as a
MP stated. “And science is often inconclusive, so we cannot wait.”
39 This is based on the precautionary principle used in environmental policies “Where there are threats of
serious irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development 1992: principle 15)”.
40 Earlier Morris [36] also argued that scientific research is often not the bases for new policies.
41 Speech at a conference 10 February 2006, available at www.number10.gov.uk (last visited 15 December
2008).
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Furthermore, the ASBO has simply a practical appeal. Some respondents claimed
it basically fits the already existing set of instruments. For example if the proposed
behavioural order is breached, it becomes a criminal act on the basis of the already
existing article 184 Sr.
So the established policy transfer of the ASBO can be explained by many different
factors. Ranking from the need for symbolic communication with the Dutch people after
the populist revolt, being a convenient policy umbrella, to economic reasoning and
problems with minorities. A common culture of control is just one of them.
Conclusion
This article empirically tested how much proximity in Dutch and UK policies
towards ASB can be explained by intentional efforts to follow the UK Model. And
after analyzing the results indeed it can be concluded that a form of policy transfer
between the UK and the Netherlands occurred. But what does this mean? What is the
relevance of the origins of policy ideas? Why should it matter if inspiration is drawn
from another jurisdiction?
As concluded earlier, in criminology there is not much focus on the process of
policymaking. This lack in policy research on a meso-level does sometimes lead to
assumptions on a macro-level that are not empirically founded. For example in our era
of globalisation it is often assumed that similar circumstances will almost inevitably lead
to similar outcomes, and that similar policies have their roots in similar rationales.
But this article did not only look at the surface of apparent similarities, it also
investigated potential for dissimilarities. By identifying elements of non transfer it
illustrated that the human agency is an important element in explanations of
contemporary crime control trends.
This research showed translation of policies is not so straightforward and that it is
embedded in a cultural context. It demonstrated that policy-making is a messy result
of intuitive appeal, traveling myths and unintended consequences. This approach of
policymaking is also known as the policy of ‘muddling through’ [9, 21, 38].
Although politicians often call for evidence-based policies, in this article it
becomes clear that research evidence is often not a base for policies. More often
assumed positive effects from abroad, assumed feelings of citizens and assumed
proven crime theories form the basis of the policy. Policy transfer appears to be more
a form of gaining inspiration, rather than real lesson drawing. This makes the policy
making process, unpredictable and not evidence based. This article identifies a form
of hyper activity of the Dutch government in creating new measures to tackle ASB.
The question is, is such a messy policymaking process a bad thing for society?
The research shows that pilots and laws have advanced in such a frenetic pace as
to leave too little space for considered reflection. I would like to argue that more
time is needed to reflect on the normative and social implications of legal reforms
and their effectiveness in regulating behaviour. The evidence from the UK suggests
that the ASBO may end up being counterproductive, alienating young people who
feel unfairly treated and stigmatised by such measures. A hard policy transfer of the
ASBO can have a boomerang-effect; alienating young Moroccans from Dutch
society. This could and should not be the desired result of new Dutch crime policies.
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